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1 Introduction
This paper is a study of how recent regulatory changes to Over-the-Counter (OTC)
derivative markets have altered the quality of those markets. In particular, we
examine how implementation of the centralized trading mandate of the Dodd-Frank
act has impacted liquidity and trading patterns in interest rate swap (hereafter
‘swap’) markets, the world’s largest OTC derivative market (BIS (2014)).
Prior to the implementation of Dodd-Frank, swap trading was largely decen-
tralized and opaque. There was no central source for trade information and no
liquidity hub that published pre-trade information on quotes and sizes. Therefore,
buyers and sellers bore pecuniary and time costs when searching for quotes and
counterparties (see Duffie et al. (2005) and Duffie (2012)). The opaque nature of
the market and imperfect competition among swap dealers may also have allowed
the largest swap dealers to exploit other traders (see Kyle (1985) and Vayanos and
Wang (2012)).
A key change to swap trading, as a result of Dodd-Frank, was the introduc-
tion of Swap Execution Facilities (SEFs).1 These are multi-lateral trading venues,
featuring an open limit order book (LOB) as well as a request for quote (RFQ)
functionality whereby customers can electronically solicit quotes from multiple
dealers simultaneously. Thus, SEFs represent a consolidated liquidity pool via
which investors can see firm, quoted swap rates on a continuous basis and as such
they dramatically alter the traditional, voice-based, bilateral mode of trading in
OTC derivatives markets.
SEF trading has been available since early October 2013, and since February
2014 all trades in eligible swap contracts, that involve US persons, must take place
1Dodd-Frank also mandated central clearing of swap trades as well as post-trade disclosure
of swap trade details. The clearing mandate came into effect on March 11, 2013 and the trade
reporting mandate came into effect on December 31, 2012.
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on a SEF. The SEF mandate implementation was followed by a debate amongst
regulators about the efficacy of the reform and its impact on liquidity and trading
relations (see Giancarlo (2015), Massad (2016), Powell (2016)). In addition, similar
rules are currently on the drawing board in the European Union, as part of the
Markets In Financial Instruments Regulation (MiFIR), and are expected to be
rolled out by 2018.
Our goal is to test whether this regulatory innovation has improved or damaged
swap market liquidity. For our analysis we use proprietary data from the London
Clearing House (LCH) between January 2013 and September 2014, supplemented
with public data from the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (DTCC).
Both sources contain information on executed swap transactions. The LCH data,
in addition to the usual trade variables, contains counterparty information from
which we can infer traders’ geographic locations (e.g. US- versus non-US-based
entities) and trader type (e.g. dealer versus client). The data also tell us whether
a trade was executed on a SEF. We employ a difference-in-differences technique
to isolate the effects of the introduction of SEF trading on liquidity. Liquidity
here is measured using the dispersion of execution prices around a benchmark, as
in Jankowitsch et al. (2011), or Amihud’s price impact measure (Amihud (2002)).
The treatment group of assets in our difference-in-differences tests is the set of
USD swaps that were required to trade on a SEF after February 2014. Our control
groups are either the USD swaps that were not captured by the SEF trading
mandate or the EUR swaps that were mandated, but which are mostly traded by
non-US persons who, in turn, are not captured by the SEF trading requirement.
We show that the introduction of SEF trading was associated with a statisti-
cally and economically significant improvement in liquidity and trading activity,
particularly for those swaps where SEFs are most heavily used. For example, rel-
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ative to EUR mandated swaps, execution costs for USD mandated swaps drop by
about $3 - $4 million daily for market end-users (i.e. non-dealers). This results
from an absolute reduction in execution costs for both USD and EUR mandated
contracts. In particular, total execution costs for end-users are reduced by about
$7 - $13 million daily for USD mandated swaps and by $3-$9 million daily for EUR
mandated contracts, after the introduction of SEF trading. Overall, our findings
suggest that greater penetration of multi-lateral transparent venues improves trad-
ing conditions. They also suggest that the introduction of SEFs addressed some
of the market imperfections observed in traditional OTC markets. As a result of
the more centralized and more pre-trade transparent swap trading via SEFs, quote
competition strengthened, participation increased and liquidity improved.2
We then examine if the SEF trade mandate has brought about any changes
in the geography of trading. The mandate only captures US persons, meaning
that, for every other market participant, trading on-SEF is optional. Thus, to
the extent that a non-US person might want to trade off-SEF, they would need to
select another non-US entity as a counterparty. Such a desire to trade off-SEF may,
therefore, geographically fragment swap markets. The possibility of a geographical
fracture in swap markets, and an associated drop in market liquidity, has been a
feature of the policy debate since the implementation of the SEF trade mandate.3
We find that, after the introduction of SEFs, the percentage of trading volume
between US and non-US domiciled traders in EUR swaps declined markedly and
abruptly from a daily average of 20% to 5%, while no changes were observed for
2According to data from the National Futures Association (NFA), in practice there is limited
usage of the SEF LOB functionality so any increase in pre-trade transparency is mainly driven by
the RFQ mechanism. The trading mandate also aimed to increase post-trade transparency by re-
quiring SEFs to publish daily trading activity on their websites. We describe SEF characteristics
in detail in Section 3.
3See, for example, industry reports such as ISDA (2014a), ISDA (2014b), as well as a recent
US Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) white paper (Giancarlo (2015)).
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USD swaps. Further, we show that the observed decline in trans-Atlantic volume
for EUR contracts, was almost entirely driven by swap dealers with trading desks
in multiple locations, migrating the bulk of their inter-dealer activity to their non-
US (primarily European) branches.4 We do not observe any similar pattern for
trades that involve end-users.
This suggests that there are costs, pecuniary or otherwise, to trading on SEFs
which dealers seek to avoid. For example, dealers in EUR denominated swaps
may wish to move their trading activity from their US desks to European desks if
this enables them to trade off-SEFs and retain a degree of power over who they
trade with. This power could allow them to exclude new entrants from the inter-
dealer EUR swap market which, in turn, would preclude new entrants from trading
effectively in the client market.5 Thus, the observed geographic fragmentation
might be a result of dealers attempting to maintain entry barriers to (EUR) swap
trading.6
This raises the question whether the migration of inter-dealer volume to non-US
branches has in itself impaired market liquidity. This concern has ben expressed
4For related press coverage, see also ‘Big US banks make swaps a foreign affair’ in the Wall St
Journal (http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304788404579520302570888332).
5This would not be feasible for USD swaps as the inter-dealer market is well established,
geographically, in the US, while the bulk of EUR swap trading already happens in Europe.
6In fact, in November 2013, the CFTC published guidelines pertaining to SEFs (Commod-
ity Futures Trading Commission (2013)), which, amongst other things, gives examples of SEF
“enablement mechanisms” which can be used to restrict the ability of some market participants
to interact with a SEF’s trading systems. For example, one such mechanism (labeled “counter-
party filter”), might “preven[t] a market participant from interacting or trading with, or viewing
the bids and offers (firm or indicative) displayed by any other market participant on that SEF,
whether by means of any condition or restriction on its ability or authority to display a quote to
any other market participant or to respond to any quote issued by any other market participant
on that SEF, or otherwise”. Such a mechanism could be used by incumbent dealers to deny
access to the interdealer market to a potential entrant. In its guidelines, the CFTC deemed such
activities inconsistent with the requirement for impartial access on SEFs.
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in a number of industry reports and in the press.7 Our analysis shows that this
migration has not had any incremental negative effect on trading costs. However,
our results do suggest that it has likely prevented EUR swap liquidity from sharing
the improvement documented in the USD segment of the market.
Overall, our results show that the increased transparency and lower entry bar-
riers that SEFs brought about have significantly improved trading conditions for
swaps, especially for those instruments that were forced to trade upon them. How-
ever, the uneven application of regulation of this global market across different
regions has caused trading to fracture along geographical lines, meaning that the
liquidity benefits of increased centralization and competition are not being fully
realized.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature.
Section 3 sets out the regulatory changes that affected swap markets as a result of
Dodd-Frank and gives a detailed description of SEFs. Section 4 describes our data
sources and presents a set of summary statistics. Section 5 presents the difference-
in-differences tests of the impact of centralized trading on market activity and
liquidity. Section 6 describes the changes in the geography of swap trading and
Section 7 concludes.
2 Literature Review
Our work is related to a sizeable literature on the relationship between execution
costs and transparency in various market settings. On the theoretical side, the
most closely related paper is Duffie et al. (2005) who formally show that “bid-ask
7See for example ISDA (2014a) and ISDA (2014b) for an industry perspective as well as press
coverage in the Financial Times such as ‘CFTC Calls for International Help on Derivatives Over-
sight’ (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3aeabbb0-6b63-11e4-9337-00144feabdc0.html) and
‘US swaps trading rules have split market’
(http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/58251f84-82b8-11e3-8119-00144feab7de.html).
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spreads are lower if investors can more easily find other investors or have eas-
ier access to multiple market-makers”.8 Another relevant study is Hendershott
and Madhavan (2015) who examine the efficacy of electronic venues at facilitating
trading in OTC markets. These authors show that a periodic one-sided electronic
auction mechanism can be a viable source of liquidity. Interestingly, this mech-
anism has some similarities to the SEF RFQ functionality in that it encourages
dealer competition without disseminating trading intentions and dealer quotes to
all market participants. This results in better prices while limiting information
leakages. Theory predictions in Pagano and Roell (1996) also support the view
that more transparency enhances liquidity. Vayanos and Wang (2012) survey the
literature and explain how illiquidity is related to various market imperfections.
They show that participation costs, imperfect competition and search frictions all
have a detrimental effect on liquidity.
The result that increased pre-trade transparency improves liquidity chimes with
those from work on other asset classes.9 For example, Boehmer et al. (2005) show
that when the NYSE allowed traders who were not located on the exchange floor to
see the contents of the limit order book, this resulted in a significant improvement
in liquidity. Harris and Piwowar (2006) argue that the fact that smaller corporate
bond trades are more costly to execute than large trades is due to large trades being
done by large institutions with clear views of the market while small traders suffer
a lack of transparency and thus greater costs. Green et al. (2007) study municipal
bond markets and find that dealers earn lower average markups on larger trades
even though they bear higher risk. The authors interpret this as evidence of dealer
8Similarly, Yin (2005) shows that, in the presence of costs for searching for better prices,
expected spreads are smaller in centralized markets. These markets are preferred by liquidity
traders, while dealers prefer fragmented markets.
9It is also in line with the experimental results in Flood et al. (1999), who demonstrate that
opacity, through its effect on search costs, reduces liquidity (although it causes price discovery
to improve).
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market power that results from market opacity. They proceed to show how dealer
market power increases execution costs and also that it is positively related to the
length of intermediation chains. Goldstein et al. (2007), Edwards et al. (2007) and
Bessembinder et al. (2006) show that introducing post-trade transparency to US
corporate bond markets had, on balance, a positive effect on liquidity (exceptions
were found for very thinly-traded bonds and for the largest trades). Evidence that
links transparency with liquidity in other markets can also be found in Naik et al.
(1999) and Boehmer et al. (2005). Foucault et al. (2010) offer a survey of the
theoretical and empirical literature on market transparency.
Finally, our work is related to a number of more recent studies focusing on OTC
derivatives markets and the impact of recent regulatory developments. Fulop and
Lescourret (2015) study the impact on liquidity of the standardization of contracts
(in 2009) and the reporting of aggregate weekly post-trade data (in 2008) in the
single-name CDS market. They find that the standardization of CDS contracts
improved liquidity across the market, while the post-trade data disclosure improved
the liquidity only for a subset of CDS contracts. Loon and Zhong (2014) and Loon
and Zhong (2015) also study the effects of Dodd-Frank, although they concentrate
on the two other key provisions of the Act, namely centralized clearing and post-
trade reporting.10 Employing data from the CDS market, they show that the
introduction of a central counterparty to CDS trades reduces counterparty credit
risk and, through its effect on post-trade transparency, improves liquidity. They
also show that an increase in post-trade transparency brought about by post-trade
reporting also contributed to improvements in liquidity. Our paper focuses instead
on the impact of pre-trade transparency as related to the third pillar of the Dodd-
Frank OTC derivatives regulation, i.e. the mandate for centralized trading. Our
10For an overview of centralized clearing in credit derivatives, see Acharya et al. (2009).
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study also focuses on the IRS market which is substantially larger in terms of
notional amounts outstanding than the CDS market.
3 Policy Context and Institutional Details
3.1 OTC derivatives and the Dodd-Frank Act
A major pillar of the US Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the
“Dodd-Frank Act”) concerns OTC derivatives markets. In particular, owing to
concerns that insufficient collateralization and opacity in these markets contributed
to systemic risk during the crisis, Title VII of the Act implemented a series of re-
forms aimed at mitigating counterparty risk and improving pre- and post-trade
transparency in swaps markets. As such, it mandates centralized clearing for eli-
gible contracts, it requires real-time reporting and public dissemination of trans-
actions and also requires that eligible contracts should be traded on SEFs, a form
of multilateral electronic trading venue. Because of its characteristics (described
in detail in the next section), SEF trading brings about a marked increase in the
level of pre-trade transparency for the affected swap contracts.
The Dodd-Frank trading mandate was implemented by the CFTC in two
phases. In the first, which took effect on October 2, 2013, SEF trading became
available for OTC derivatives on a voluntary basis. This meant that, as of that
date, the newly authorized trading venues had to comply with a number of princi-
ples and requirements, including for instance the obligation to operate a limit order
9
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book and to automatically disseminate requests for quotes to multiple dealers.11
In the second phase, specific contracts were explicitly required to be executed on
SEFs. The mandate captured a wide range of interest rate swap (IRS) contracts
of various currencies and maturities as well as several credit default swap (CDS)
indices. The determination of the mandated contracts was (and still is) primarily
SEF-driven (through the Made Available to Trade (MAT) procedure). A SEF can
submit a determination that a swap is available for trade to the CFTC, which
then reviews the submission. Once a swap is certified as available to trade, all
other SEFs that offer this swap for trading must do so in accordance with the re-
quirements of the trade mandate. The criteria for MAT determination include the
trading volume of the swap and the frequency of transactions. Table 1 shows the
mandated maturities along with the mandate date for the plain vanilla USD- and
EUR-denominated IRS contracts which we use in our analysis. Most maturities
were mandated on February 15 2014 with a couple more maturities following suit
a few days later on the 26th.
The SEF trading mandate only captures “US persons” with the definition of
a US person being relatively broad.12 Importantly, the mandate affects the trades
of US persons regardless of who their counterparty is. In other words, if a US
11This does not mean that there were no electronic venues in operation or that no swaps were
being traded on limit order books or other multilateral trading platforms before October 2, 2013.
It only means that after this date, any venue that was officially recognized as a SEF had to
comply with the specific CFTC minimum requirements mentioned above. Unfortunately, we
have no data on the methods of execution prior to October 2, 2103. Nevertheless, if swaps were
already being traded on pre-trade transparent electronic platforms before this date, this should
bias us against finding any differences in market conditions when making a “before versus after”
comparison. Our analysis shows that the differences were actually substantial.
12Apart from US-registered swap dealers and major participants, the definition of
a US person also includes foreign entities that carry guarantees from a US person
(e.g. the foreign branch of a US dealer) and also any entities with personnel on
US soil which is substantially involved in arranging, negotiating or executing a trans-
action. According to market reports this created initially some uncertainty as to who
is captured. See for example: http://www.risk.net/risk-magazine/news/2256600/
broader-us-person-definition-could-cause-clearing-avalanche-participants-warn
10
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person is to trade a mandated contract with a non-US person, the trade has to be
executed on a SEF.
3.2 Swap Execution Facility (SEF) Characteristics
SEFs are electronic trading platforms where, according to the CFTC, “multiple
participants have the ability to execute swaps by accepting bids and offers made
by multiple participants in the platform”. In practice, SEFs have two different
functionalities to facilitate this. The first is a fully fledged central limit order book
which allows any market participant to supply liquidity by posting bids and offers.13
Theoretically, this functionality allows end-users to bypass dealers altogether in
concluding a trade, assuming of course that the order book has sufficient liquidity.
The second functionality is a modification of the existing request-for-quote
(RFQ) dealer-centric model. The innovation, relative to standard single-dealer
platforms, is that a client’s request for a quote is disseminated simultaneously and
instantly to multiple dealers instead of just one. This enables the client to easily
compare prices across dealers and thus promotes competition for client order flow
among dealers. The law required that a RFQ be communicated to no less than two
market participants during a phase-in period until October 2014 and, subsequent
to that period, to no less than three market participants. Upon transmission
of the request for quote, the dealers may respond by posting their quotes to the
client.14 Importantly, dealers cannot see each others’ quotes nor do they know how
13For swaps that are subject to the trade mandate, SEF regulation also requires that broker-
dealers, who have the ability to execute against a customer’s order or execute two customers
against each other, be subject to a 15-second timing delay between the entry of the two orders
on the LOB. This is intended to limit broker-dealer internalization of trades and to incentivize
competition between market participants.
14It is worth noting that CFTC did not impose any requirement that the identity of the RFQ
requester be disclosed. This was due to concerns expressed by market participants that the
disclosure of the RFQ requester identity would cause information leakages about future trading
intentions. See Foucault et al. (2007) and Nolte et al. (2015) for a discussion on the implications
of the disclosure of counterparty identities.
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many and which other dealers have received the request. In addition, the market
participants responding to the RFQ cannot be affiliated with the RFQ requester
and may not be affiliated with each other. This arrangement makes it hard for
dealers to collude and effectively renders the bidding process a first-price, sealed
bid auction.
The two trading functionalities are designed to operate in conjunction for swaps
that are subject to the trade execution mandate. This means that a SEF must
provide a RFQ requester with any resting bid or offer on the SEF’s order book
alongside any quotes received by the dealers from whom quotes have been re-
quested. The requester retains the discretion to execute either against the resting
quotes on the LOB or against the RFQ responses.15 Upon execution of a transac-
tion on a SEF’s LOB or RFQ system, the SEF can establish a short time period for
a work-up session open to all market participants. That is all market participants
can trade an additional quantity of the same swap at the same price as the initial
trade. The SEF’s trading protocol can provide the counterparties who initiated
the first trade execution priority in the work-up session. Duffie and Zhu (2015)
show that work-up protocols can enhance price discovery and liquidity.
Overall, SEFs change the microstructure of the market in two important ways.
First, they increase pre-trade transparency in the IRS and CDS markets by al-
lowing market participants to observe prices quoted by dealers much more easily.
Previously, if an end-user wanted to shop around for prices she would have to se-
quentially contact multiple dealers. This was both expensive and time consuming.
Second, SEFs increase competition between swap liquidity suppliers. SEFs make
comparison of dealer quotes much more straightforward, they allow new entrants
15Any trades of swap contracts that are not subject to the mandate can still be executed on
a SEF and the SEF must offer an order book. However, the SEF is also free to offer any other
method of execution (including bilateral trading and voice-based systems) for these trades.
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to the swap dealing business to start supplying liquidity on LOBs and they al-
low end-users to trade directly with each other and to completely bypass dealers.
While, in practice, most of the liquidity provision is still being done by traditional
dealers, SEFs have eroded their market power and increased competitive pressures.
4 Data and Summary Statistics
4.1 Swap Transaction Data
In our analysis we use transaction data for USD and EUR denominated vanilla
spot interest rate swaps, which we obtain from the LCH and the DTCC.
LCH clears approximately 50% of the global interest rate swap market and
more than 90% of the overall cleared interest rate swaps through the SwapClear
clearing platform. Its services are used by almost 100 financial institutions from
over 30 countries, including all major dealers. We obtain the reports of all new
trades that were cleared by LCH between January 1, 2013 and September 15, 2014.
Each LCH report contains information on the date of trade, effective trade,
maturity date, notional, swap rate, and other contract characteristics. In addition,
a report includes the identities of the counterparties, which allows us to categorize
trades by type of counterparty (dealer vs. non-dealer) and location (US, EU etc).
Since April 2014 LCH reports also contain information on whether a transaction is
executed on a trading venue, the name of the venue, as well as whether the venue
is authorized as a SEF.
We apply a number of filters to clean these data. First, we keep only spot
starting swaps, which we do by removing any reports whose effective date is more
than 2 business days from the trade date. Next, we remove duplicate reports.
Duplicate reports exist because for every transaction that is centrally cleared,
13
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the clearing house produces one report per counterparty. We also remove any
portfolio or compression trades as they are not price-forming.16 Finally, to remove
any inaccurate or false reports we keep only trades where the percentage difference
between the reported swap rate and Bloomberg’s end-of-day rate for the same
currency and maturity is less than 5% in absolute value.
Although LCH is the global leader in clearing interest rate swaps, there are
other clearing houses that offer competing services, for example the Chicago Mer-
cantile Exchange (CME). To ensure that our results are representative of the whole
clearing space, we complement the LCH data with data from the DTCC, a trade
repository (TR) operator. As part of the Dodd-Frank Act, the CFTC required
all US and certain types of non-US market participants to submit trade reports
to swap trade repositories, which in turn make these data available to the public
in real-time.17 The DTTC was the first to operate a TR on December 31, 2012.
We extract all transactions that were reported to the DTCC between January 1,
2013 and September 15, 2014. DTCC reports contain information on many con-
tract characteristics, including whether a trade is centrally cleared or executed on
a SEF. Similar to the LCH data, we select centrally cleared USD and EUR de-
nominated vanilla spot interest rate swaps. In addition, we remove any duplicates,
cancellation reports, and any swaps with additional terms that affect the swap’s
price. We also remove extreme prices and misreports by applying the same rules
as used for the LCH data. The final step in our data cleaning methodology is the
removal of any trades that were reported to both LCH and DTCC. To remove
16Compression trades are used in order to reduce the total notional amounts outstanding of
the participating institutions, while leaving their net notional amounts unchanged. The purpose
of this is to reduce the amount of counterparty risk (which is a function of gross notional) while
maintaining the same level of exposure to market risk.
17For more details see the CFTC’s “Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding
Compliance with Certain Swap Regulations” at http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/
@newsroom/documents/file/crossborder_factsheet_final.pdf.
14
 
 
 
Staff Working Paper No. 580 July 2016 
 
these duplicate reports we apply an algorithm that matches LCH and DTCC re-
ports based on trade date, effective trade, maturity date, notional, swap rate, and
other contract characteristics that are common in both data sets.
After filtering the data, we are left with a sample of 628,896 trade reports
which account for a total $58.17 trillion in traded notional over our sample period.
In Figure 1 we show the time series of trading volume by currency. This figure
illustrates the sheer size of the swap market with volumes hovering around $70-80
billion for each currency on a daily basis. We can also see that total volume is
roughly equally split between USD and EUR denominated swaps.
A unique feature of the LCH reports is that they contain information on the
identities of the counterparties. Specifically, for every trade that is centrally cleared
by LCH we can see the Business Identifier Code (BIC) code of the counterparties.18
The BIC allows us to identify the dealers, their branches and their associated
jurisdictions. OTC derivatives dealers are primarily large international financial
institutions that facilitate trading between end users. We classify as dealers the
top 16 banks by volume in our sample, while any other counterparty is classified
as a client.19
In Figure 2 we present the shares of volume by type of counterparty. The
majority of trades are between dealers, which is consistent with the commonly held
view that a small number of dealers dominates the OTC swap market. Dealer-to-
client trades account for about one-third of the market in both currencies. One
difference between the two currencies is that the share of client-to-client trading
18BIC is a unique identification code for financial institutions approved by the International
Organization for Standardization (ISO). It has typically 8 characters made up of (i) 4 letters that
identify the bank, (ii) 2 letters that identify the country, and (iii) 2 letters or digits that identify
the city.
19This choice is not arbitrary on our part as these banks are also classified as “Participating
Dealers” in the OTC Derivatives Supervisors Group, chaired by the New York Fed: https:
//www.newyorkfed.org/markets/otc_derivatives_supervisors_group.html
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activity for USD-denominated swaps is twice as large as that in EUR-denominated
swaps.
With regard to location, we use the BIC to decompose trading activity into (i)
trades between US financial institutions, (ii) trades between US and non-US finan-
cial institutions, and (iii) trades between non-US financial institutions. Figure 3
presents this decomposition. About 50% of trading in USD-denominated swaps
involves a US and a non-US counterparty, 30% two US counterparties, and 20%
two non-US counterparties. For EUR-denominated swaps, the US to non-US trad-
ing activity makes up only 14% of the sample, while the vast majority of trades,
about 80%, are between non-US counterparties.
Using the DTCC data, we plot in Figure 4 the time series of on-SEF trad-
ing from January 1, 2013 to September 15, 2014. We observe that after Octo-
ber 2, 2013, the date when SEF trading was introduced, the majority of USD-
denominated swaps reported to DTCC are executed on swap execution facilities.
The fraction of SEF trading for these swaps (the blue line) increases steadily, from
about 60% in October 2013 to over 80% in September 2014. On the other hand,
SEF trading in EUR-denominated swaps is less pronounced, with the fraction of
SEF trading (the red dotted line) hovering between 20% and 40%.
Figure 4 demonstrates that the CFTC does not have the power to enforce the
US trading mandate in markets that are dominated by non-US counterparties,
for example the EUR-denominated swap market (see Figure 3). This observation
motivates the empirical strategy employed later in the paper.
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5 SEF Trading and Market Quality
5.1 Liquidity Variables
Our choice of liquidity variables is driven by data availability and the OTC nature
of the IRS market. The main limitations we face are the lack of reliable bid and
ask quotes and the fact that our trade reports are not time-stamped. As a result,
we cannot construct a direct measure of effective spreads or any liquidity metric
that relies on transaction sequencing. Instead, we use metrics that require only
executed trades.
We use two price dispersion measures to proxy for execution costs. The first is
the price dispersion proposed by Jankowitsch et al. (2011). This is defined as:
DispJNSi,t =
√√√√Ni,t∑
k=1
V lmk,i,t
V lmi,t
(
Pk,i,t −mi,t
mi,t
)2
(1)
where mi,t is the end-of-day t mid-quote of contract i, as reported by Bloomberg,
V lmk,i,t is the volume of transaction k and V lmi,t =
∑
k V lmk,i,t is the total
volume for contract i on day t. Jankowitsch et al. (2011) derive this measure from
a market microstructure model where it is shown to capture inventory and search
costs, making it a good candidate for measuring liquidity in OTC markets. Low
dispersion of prices around the Bloomberg benchmark indicates low trading costs
and high liquidity, and vice versa.
The use of end-of-day Bloomberg quotes as a benchmark of a contract’s fair
value might be problematic in days of high intraday volatility. For example, the
value of a contract might be very different before and after a macroeconomic an-
nouncement. To control for this possibility we employ a variation of the Jankow-
itsch et al. (2011) price dispersion where we use the average execution price on a
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day as the price benchmark. More formally:
DispVWi,t =
√√√√Ni,t∑
k=1
V lmk,i,t
V lmi,t
(
Pk,i,t − P¯i,t
P¯i,t
)2
(2)
where Ni,t is the total number of trades executed for contract i on day t, Pk,i,t is
the execution price of transaction k, P¯i,t is the average execution price on contract
i and day t, and we require at least four intraday observations to determine the
average execution price. Both dispersion metrics are comparable across contracts
of different currencies and maturities as they are percentage deviations from a price
benchmark.
The last liquidity variable we use is the Amihud (2002) price impact, defined
for contract i on day t as:
Amihudi,t =
1
T
T−1∑
j=0
|Ri,t−j|
V lmi,t−j
(3)
where we take T = 40 and V lmi,t is the total volume traded for contract i on day
t, expressed in $ trillion. All of these liquidity measures have been used before
in the context of OTC derivatives markets and are shown to strongly relate to
other conventional liquidity proxies, see for example the evidence in Goyenko et al.
(2009), Friewald et al. (2012), Friewald et al. (2014), Loon and Zhong (2014), and
Loon and Zhong (2015) among others.
5.2 Panel diff-in-diff specifications
To assess the impact of SEF trading on market liquidity and activity, we estimate
two panel specifications that implement difference-in-differences tests. The idea is
to see if the impact of SEF trading on a treatment group of IRS contracts causes
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their liquidity to diverge from that of a control group after our event dates. As
event dates we take the 2nd of October 2013 when SEF trading became available
(and trades could be executed on SEFs on a voluntary basis) and the CFTC man-
date effective dates shown in Table 1. On these dates (which vary across contract
maturities) it became mandatory for US persons to trade the specific maturities on
SEFs.20 Table 2 summarizes the main variables used in the difference-in-differences
models that follow.
Test 1: USD vs. EUR mandated contracts
For our first diff-in-diff test we use the mandated USD-denominated contracts as
a treatment group and the mandated EUR-denominated contracts as a control
group. The USD segment of the IRS market has a substantially higher proportion
of U.S. participants who are captured by the CFTC mandate. The EUR contracts,
however, may be mandated but they are mainly traded by non-US persons who
are not required to trade on a SEF (see Figure 3). Thus, if transparency improves
liquidity, we would expect the liquidity of USD contracts to improve relative to
that of EUR contracts.21 An advantage of using the mandated EUR-denominated
contracts as a control group is that both the treatment and control groups have
similar liquidity profiles, which implies that our results are not subject to selection
bias. On the other hand, liquidity and activity in the EUR segment of the market
might be driven by different fundamentals. We control for this possibility by
including a number of currency specific control variables in our specifications.
20These event dates are after the implementation of the reporting mandate on December 31,
2012 and the clearing mandate on March 11, 2013. Nevertheless, the clearing mandate imple-
mentation occurs during our pre-event sample period which starts on January 2, 2013. For this
reason, we also do our analysis using data only after March 11, 2013. Since the results are
essentially the same as the ones obtained when using the full data, they are not reported here.
21Of course, to the extent that SEFs are also used by participants in EUR mandated contacts,
even to a lower degree, we would expect their liquidity to improve too, albeit by a smaller amount.
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We implement this test by estimating the following panel specification:
Lit = α+β1Date
(1)
t +β2CurriDate
(1)
t +β3Date
(2)
t +β4CurriDate
(2)
t +γ
′Xt+ui+it
(4)
where i indexes the set of swap contracts (defined by maturity and currency) and
t denotes days. Lit is a liquidity or market activity variable. These are the dis-
persion and Amihud variables defined in equations (2) to (3) whereas our activity
variables include daily volume traded, the daily number of trades executed and the
number of unique market participants active on a given day. Date
(j)
t , j = 1, 2 are
dummies for the two event dates equalling one after the respective events and zero
otherwise, Curri is a currency dummy that is equal to one for USD contracts and
zero for EUR contracts and Xt is a vector of controls. The control variables include
stock market returns, stock index implied volatilities as proxies for overall market
uncertainty, overnight unsecured borrowing rate spreads for both markets as prox-
ies for dealer funding costs and yield curve slopes intended to capture differences
in fundamentals between the USD and EUR market segments. This specification
explicitly disentangles liquidity/activity in the two currency groups as well as any
changes in liquidity after the two events. The coefficients β1 and β3 capture any ef-
fects that are common to both market segments and coefficients β2 and β4 capture
incremental effects that are particular to the USD market segment. We estimate
the model using currency and maturity fixed effects and cluster the standard errors
by both maturity and currency.
Table 3 shows the results of this estimation. The models are estimated with
and without the control variables, although there is little difference in the key
coefficients across those two specifications. A first result to note is that after
SEF trading became available on 2 October 2013 (Date(1) dummy) there is an
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improvement in liquidity for both market segments as the significantly negative
coefficients on Date(1) and the insignificant interaction terms indicate. On the
contrary, following the SEF mandate there is a clear differential effect between
the USD and EUR segments of the market with the USD contracts showing a
significant further liquidity improvement relative to the EUR contracts.
These effects are economically very significant. For example, the coefficients
for the Curr × Date(1) and Curr × Date(2) interaction terms in the dispersion
specifications suggest that the marginal reduction in execution costs of the USD
mandated versus the EUR mandated contracts is in the order of 12% to 16% of
previous dispersion levels. This reduction in execution costs amounts to roughly
$3-$4 million daily for market end-users. The total effect for USD mandated
contracts is yet bigger with a drop in execution costs by about 22% to 27% of
previous dispersion levels, which amounts to roughly $7-$13 million daily for end-
users. The effect on the EUR contracts is also substantial, despite the fact that
fewer participants are captured by the mandate. The reduction in execution costs
is about 10% to 12% or $3-$9 million daily. These calculations are based on
the standard pricing formula of a fixed-to-floating swap and measure the present
value of the savings that accrue to end-users as a result of reduced execution costs
associated with a contract’s fixed future payments.22
Regarding the activity variables, the results suggest that there was a reduction
in activity for EUR contracts and a respective increase in USD contracts mainly
after SEF trading became available. It is interesting here that although activity
22More specifically, we calculate the reduction in execution costs for all market participants
as:
∑
i βi × V lm × P¯ ×Maturity where βi are the estimated coefficients from model (5), V lm
is the average daily volume of USD mandated contracts ($75 billion), P¯ is their average volume-
weighted price (1.7%) and Maturity is their average volume-weighted maturity (7 years). In
doing this calculation we are assuming a zero risk-free rate which is realistic for the time period
that we consider. We multiply further with the average fraction of dealer-to-client volume (33%)
to estimate the reduction in execution costs for the market end-users.
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in EUR mandated contracts declined, liquidity actually improved, presumably
because the market became more transparent. We do not observe any significant
difference in trading activity between the USD and EUR contracts after the second
event (February 2015). Another noteworthy effect is that after both events, the
number of parties trading in USD markets rose significantly relative to the number
of traders in EUR markets. Thus breadth of participation in USD markets rose.
In all of these estimations, coefficients on the control variables are largely in-
significant; the only consistently signed and significant coefficient is that on the
VIX, which indicates that execution costs and activity rise in more volatile times,
consistent with microstructure theory.
Test 2: USD mandated vs. USD non-mandated contracts
For the second diff-in-diff test we concentrate exclusively on USD contracts and
use the mandated maturities as a treatment group and non-mandated USD swaps
as the control group.23 This test has the advantage of comparing contracts whose
prices are driven by the same set of fundamentals.
We implement this test by estimating the following panel specification:
Lit = α+β1Date
(1)
t +β2MATiDate
(1)
t +β3Date
(2)
t +β4MATiDate
(2)
t +γ
′Xt+ui+it
(5)
where now i denotes maturities and t denotes days. The key right-hand side
variables used are the same as above with the only difference being that we now
have a dummy variable (MATi) indicating whether a given contract maturity has
been mandated by the CFTC. Also, as we are only dealing with USD contracts in
this estimation, we shrink the control variable set to remove data from European
23The mandated maturities are: 2Y, 3Y, 5Y, 7Y, 10Y, 12Y, 15Y, 20Y and 30Y. The non-
mandated maturities are: 1Y, 8Y, 9Y and 25Y.
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equity and fixed income markets. We estimate this model using maturity fixed
effects.
Table 4 shows the results of these estimations, again both with and without
control variables. The results are similar to those obtained in the previous analysis.
In particular, there is clear evidence of liquidity improvements for both mandated
and non-mandated contracts after SEF trading became available on 2 October
2013. The improvement in liquidity is partially reversed for non-mandated con-
tracts after February 2014 but remains intact for mandated ones. Overall, liquidity
rises for both mandated and non-mandated USD contracts with the increase being
significantly greater for the former.
Thus, it appears that the liquidity improvements in the mandated contracts
spilled over - to some extent - to non-mandated contracts. This is likely because
market participants also chose to trade non-mandated contracts on SEFs as soon
as the functionality became available, and presumably also because more trans-
parency for some quoted prices on the maturity curve gives market participants
a better idea of what a fair quote is for other maturities. As far as activity and
participation are concerned, again, there are positive effects only for the mandated
contracts which materialize after 2 October 2013.
5.3 SEF flag panel specifications
We next test directly how the fraction of SEF trading relates to our liquidity and
market activity variables. For that, we utilize the DTCC segment of our data
which contains a flag indicating whether a given trade was executed on a SEF or
not.
Figure 4 shows the fraction of volume for USD and EUR-denominated plain
vanilla IRS contracts that is traded on-SEF, as captured by the DTCC data. One
23
 
 
 
Staff Working Paper No. 580 July 2016 
 
can see that, for both currencies, volumes become positive after SEFs become
available on 2 October 2013, but USD-denominated contracts generally have a
higher degree of SEF trading than EUR-denominated ones. This is likely because
a larger fraction of participants in the USD segment of the market are US persons
who are captured by the SEF mandate.
To assess the impact of SEF trading on liquidity and market activity utilizing
the SEF flag, we estimate the following panel specification for mandated USD and
EUR-denominated contracts only, on a daily frequency:
Lit = α + β1SEFit + β2Date
(1)
t + γ
′Xit + ui + it (6)
In this setup, Lit is the liquidity or market activity variable for contract i on day
t. As before, we use the dispersion metrics and the Amihud measure defined in
equations (1), (2) and (3) in order to capture liquidity. We also use total volume,
number of trades and the number of unique participants to capture market activity.
SEFit is the percentage of SEF trading, Date
(1)
t is a date dummy taking the value
of 1 after the introduction of SEFs on 2 October 2013 and Xit is the same vector
of controls used previously. We include the date dummy in the specification so as
to see if the time and cross-sectional variation in SEF trading, conditional on SEF
trading being available, has incremental explanatory power. Because it is possible
that SEF trading is itself caused by market liquidity, we also estimate this model
by IV, instrumenting SEFit with its own lags.
Table 5 shows the results of this estimation. The coefficients on the percentage
of SEF trading are significant throughout and consistent with the previous findings.
A higher fraction of SEF trading is associated with increased levels of liquidity as
captured by reduced values for both the dispersion metrics as well as the Amihud
variable. Similarly, SEF trading is positive and statistically significant in the
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case of the activity variables: a higher fraction of SEF trading is associated with
higher volumes, more trades and a larger number of market participants. Overall,
these results suggest that SEF trading is associated with robust and measurable
improvements in market quality.
6 Changes in the Geography of Trading
One concern among market participants and regulators, shortly after the SEF man-
date took effect, was that it might lead to market fragmentation (ISDA (2014a)).
Since the mandate to trade on a SEF only applied to US persons, it was conceiv-
able that European, for example, counterparties who wished to avoid (for whatever
reason) trading on a SEF, might do so by trading exclusively with other European
counterparties. Indeed, some reports released after the implementation of the trade
mandate suggested that the market was becoming fragmented and that this was
causing market quality to deteriorate (e.g. Giancarlo (2015)).
In this section, we exploit our knowledge of counterparty identities in the LCH
data and investigate this issue in detail. We first classify all market participants
in the LCH data as US or non-US-based and calculate the percentage of trading
volume that is executed between US and non-US counterparties (US-to-non-US).24
Figure 5 plots this percentage for USD and EUR-denominated contracts. It is
evident that whereas no substantial effect takes place in USD-denominated con-
tracts, after the introduction of SEF trading, there is a clear reduction in the
fraction of US-to-non-US volume in EUR-denominated swaps, which drops from
a daily average of 20% prior to the SEF introduction to an average of 5% after.
More formally, Table 6 shows the results of time-series regressions of the fractions
24In practice, the majority of non-US activity is generated in Europe reflecting the fact that
most non-US dealers are European entities.
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of US-to-non-US volumes in USD and EUR contracts on the SEF introduction
event dummy and a number of controls. The dummy coefficient is highly signif-
icant and negative for the EUR contracts whereas it is insignificant for the USD
ones. We therefore confirm that the EUR segment of the swap market became
substantially more fragmented following the introduction of SEF trading.
We conjecture that the observed difference between the two market segments
is because of the much smaller proportion of US market participants in the EUR-
denominated segment of the market: if a non-US counterparty wants to trade with
another non-US counterparty and avoid executing on a SEF, they can do so much
more easily for a EUR-denominated contract than for a USD-denominated one.
However, given the beneficial effects of SEF trading, this raises the question
as to why any (and which) counterparties might want to avoid trading on SEFs.
Figure 6 shows a breakdown of the fraction of US-to-non-US volume in the EUR-
denominated contracts according to the type of counterparties. It is clear that the
observed fragmentation is entirely driven by inter-dealer trading. Thus, it appears
that it is the swap dealers who are trying to avoid using SEFs where possible.
There is no observable fragmentation for EUR trades that involve at least one
non-dealer. This might have been expected, as there is no incentive for customers
to avoid trading on SEFs (given the liquidity improvements they offer).
The question that remains is why, at the time that SEF trading was introduced,
cross-border activity by swap dealers dropped so clearly. One possibility is that
inter-dealer trading between US-based and non-US-based dealers could genuinely
have declined and could have been replaced by local (intra-US and intra-European)
trading. Alternatively, inter-dealer trades between US and non-US firms could
have been executed by the non-US branches of swap dealers who happen to have
trading desks in multiple jurisdictions. For example, a trade between a US and
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a European dealer that was being executed by the US desk of the former, could
now be executed by the European desk of the same dealer. In this case it would
be registered as an intra-European trade and would not be subject to the SEF
trade mandate. To see if this is the case, we plot in Figure 7 the fraction of inter-
dealer trading in EUR contracts done by the US and non-US trading desks of
only those swap dealers who have desks in multiple jurisdictions and who execute
more than 10% of their swap volumes from a desk located in the United States.
The figure shows that there is a sharp shift in inter-dealer activity from the US
desks to the non-US ones. The fraction of non-US desk trading increases from
a daily average of 75% prior to the introduction of SEFs, to an average of 95%
after (with the corresponding fraction of US desk trading dropping from 25% to
5%). Additionally, Figure 8 shows that there is virtually no change in the amount
of inter-dealer trading done exclusively by dealers who regularly trade the bulk
(i.e. more than 90%) of their derivatives from their European desks. We interpret
this as implying that the observed fragmentation is artificial in the sense that it is
entirely driven by a change of the trading desk location of those dealers with desks
and trading activity in multiple jurisdictions.
The preceding results are consistent with swap dealers strategically choosing
the location of the desk executing a particular trade in order to avoid trading
in a more transparent and competitive setting. A potential explanation for this
lies in attempts to maintain market power. By shifting the location of the inter-
dealer market to Europe and using European entities to execute, the SEF trading
mandate and the associated CFTC impartial access requirements are avoided. This
may give dealers control over who they trade with and how, which is turn would
allow them to exclude any potential new competitors from inter-dealer trading.
If, in turn, a potential competitor cannot access inter-dealer markets to manage
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inventory, their quotes are likely to be less tight and thus they are less likely to
attract business in the customer market.
Motivated by the analysis above, we examine what geographical fragmentation
in trading implies for market quality and activity in the EUR-denominated segment
of the IRS market. For this, we estimate a panel specification similar to those
estimated before:
Lit = α + β1fragmit + β2Date
(1)
t + γ
′Xit + ui + it, (7)
where Lit is a liquidity/activity variable of contract i on day t, fragm is a measure
of the degree of fragmentation defined as:
fragm ≡ 1− US-to-non-US Vlm
Total Vlm
,
Date(1) is the dummy marking the introduction of SEF trading on 2 October 2013
and the controls are the same as before.
Table 7 shows the results of this estimation. Two key conclusions emerge
from this Table. First, and consistent with anecdotal evidence, a higher degree of
fragmentation is indeed associated with a slowdown in market activity as captured
by the raw volume, number of trades and number of participants active. Second,
fragmentation does not appear to have affected market liquidity.25 A detrimental
effect would require the estimated coefficient β1 to be positive and significant. It is
important to note that some of the concerns about fragmentation were explicitly
about market depth decreasing and the potential price impact of trades increasing.
The insignificant coefficient β1 in the Amihud variable specification suggests that
this concern is not backed up by the data. Given that the observed fragmentation
25We also estimate model (7) only using data after the introduction of SEF trading. The
results are almost identical to the ones reported here and for this reason they are omitted.
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is artificial, this is perhaps not surprising. However, if the fragmentation is caused
by dealers attempting to maintain market power then, while liquidity might not
have been damaged, it may not have improved as much as it could, if SEF trading
in the EUR segment of the IRS market could not have been avoided by swap
dealers.
7 Summary and Conclusion
One of the pillars of the G20 reform agenda for OTC derivatives markets is the
requirement to migrate trading activity to more centralized venues, which facilitate
greater transparency. In response, and as part of Dodd-Frank, US regulators have
mandated that US persons should trade certain interest rate swap contracts on
swap execution facilities (SEFs). These venues greatly enhance transparency by
automatically disseminating requests for quotes to multiple dealers and by featur-
ing an electronic order book which allows any market participant to compete with
dealers for liquidity provision by posting quotes. Thus, SEFs induce competition
between existing dealers and also lower the barriers to potential entrants.
Using transactional data from the IRS market we assess the impact of SEF
introduction on market activity and liquidity as captured by estimates of the ef-
fective spread and the price impact of trades. We find that the move from an
OTC to a centralized, competitive market structure is associated with a substan-
tial reduction in execution costs. This is clearest for the USD mandated contracts
which are the most strongly affected, given that they are primarily traded by US
persons who are captured by the trade mandate. For these contracts, we estimate
that the marginal reduction in execution costs relative to EUR mandated contracts
amounts to as much as $3 - $4 million daily for market end-users.
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Additionally, we find that, for the EUR-denominated segment of the market,
the bulk of inter-dealer trading previously executed between US and non-US trad-
ing desks is now largely being executed by the non-US (mostly European) trading
desks of the same institutions. We interpret this as an indication that swap dealers
wish to avoid being captured by the trade mandate and the associated SEF impar-
tial access requirements articulated by the CFTC. Migrating the EUR inter-dealer
volume off-SEFs enables dealers to choose who to trade with and (more impor-
tantly) who not to trade with. Inability to access the inter-dealer market would in
turn make it difficult for a potential entrant to compete with incumbent dealers.
While our analysis suggests that so far there has been no incremental negative
impact on EUR contract liquidity as a result of this trade fragmentation, it does
also imply that it may have negated the liquidity gains experienced in the USD
segment of the market. Therefore, given the global nature of OTC derivatives
markets, our findings suggest that extending the scope of the trading mandate to
cover other sufficiently liquid swap markets would be desirable. This might be
especially important given the likely imposition of similar regulation in the EU as
part of MiFIR.
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Figure 1: Total traded volume (in $ billion) by currency. In this figure we plot the total
volume of EUR-denominated and USD-denominated plain vanilla swaps. The sample
covers every spot vanilla interest rate swap which was either cleared by LCH or reported
to DTCC between January 1, 2013 and September 15, 2014.
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Figure 2: Volume shares by type of counterparty: In this figure we decompose the
total volume into dealer-to-dealer (d2d), dealer-to-client (d2c), and client-to-client (c2c)
trading. The inner circle presents the volumes of USD-denominated swaps, while the
outer circle presents the volumes of EUR-denominated swaps. The sample covers every
spot vanilla interest rate swap which was cleared by LCH between January 1, 2013 and
September 15, 2014.
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Figure 3: Volume shares by location. In this figure we decompose the total volume
into US-to-US, US-to-non-US, and non-US-to-non-US trading. The inner circle presents
the volumes of USD-denominated swaps, while the outer circle presents the volumes of
EUR-denominated swaps. The sample covers every spot vanilla interest rate swap which
was cleared by LCH between January 1, 2013 and September 15, 2014.
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Figure 4: Fraction of SEF trading. In this figure we present the percentage of SEF trad-
ing in USD- and EUR-denominated swaps. The sample covers every spot vanilla interest
rate swap transaction reported to DTCC. The vertical line marks the introduction of
SEFs (October 2, 2013). The time period is January 1, 2013 to September 15, 2014.
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Figure 5: Fraction of US-to-non-US trading. This figure shows the percentage of US-
to-non-US trading in USD- and EUR-denominated swaps. The sample covers every
spot vanilla interest rate swap transaction reported to LCH. The vertical line marks
the introduction of SEFs (October 2, 2013). The time period is January 1, 2013 to
September 15, 2014.
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Figure 6: Breakdown of US-to-non-US trading. This figure shows the breakdown of US-
to-non-US trading volume in EUR-denominated swaps into inter-dealer volume and all
other trading volume. The sample covers every spot vanilla interest rate swap transaction
reported to LCH. The vertical line marks the introduction of SEFs (October 2, 2013).
The time period is January 1, 2013 to September 15, 2014.
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Figure 7: Breakdown of inter-dealer volume by trading desk location. This figure plots
the fractions of inter-dealer trading in EUR-denominated swaps executed by US and
non-US trading desks, for all swap dealers that have trading desks in the US and at
least one more jurisdiction. The sample covers every spot vanilla interest rate swap
transaction reported to LCH. The vertical line marks the introduction of SEFs (October
2, 2013). The time period is January 1, 2013 to September 15, 2014.
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Figure 8: This figure plots the amount of inter-dealer trading in EUR-denominated
swaps executed exclusively by swap dealers that have no trading desks in the US. The
sample covers every spot vanilla interest rate swap transaction reported to LCH. The
vertical line marks the introduction of SEFs (October 2, 2013). The time period is
January 1, 2013 to September 15, 2014.
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Table 1: SEF trading mandate dates by currency and maturity for plain vanilla IRS
contracts used in our study.
Currency Maturity Effective date
USD 2,3,5,7,10,12,15,20,30 15/02/2014
EUR 2,3,5,7,10,12,15,20,30 15/02/2014
USD 4,6 26/02/2014
EUR 4,6 26/02/2014
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Table 2: Summary statistics of daily values of the key variables, by currency. The
table shows statistics on trading volume (Vlm) measured in $ billions; daily number of
trades (Ntrades); daily unique number of active counterparties (Nparties); the fraction of
SEF (SEF ), dealer-to-dealer (D2D), and US to non-US (US-to-non-US ) trading. It also
shows statistics on the two dispersion measures and the Amihud price impact measure
described in Section 5.1. The data consists of all LCH and DTCC reported transactions
for USD- and EUR-denominated plain vanilla swaps. The time period is January 1, 2013
to September 15, 2014.
USD EUR
Mean Sd Min Max N Mean Sd Min Max N
Activity variables
Vlm ($ billion) 5.66 7.36 0.02 64.58 5559 4.44 4.49 0.06 44.90 5463
Ntrades 72.88 95.18 4 676 5559 39.82 45.36 4 346 5463
Nparties 22.04 12.25 2 61 5740 19.68 8.59 2 49 5791
Market structure
SEF (%) 0.48 0.44 0 1 5820 0.20 0.32 0 1 5072
D2D (%) 0.54 0.24 0 1 5740 0.61 0.21 0 1 5791
US-to-non-US (%) 0.48 0.21 0 1 5740 0.14 0.16 0 0.96 5791
Liquidity variables
Disp (vw)(%) 0.72 0.47 0 4.16 5559 0.67 0.46 0 3.67 5463
Disp (JNS)(%) 0.91 0.58 0.05 4.29 5559 1.16 0.82 0.07 4.60 5463
Amihud 12.92 15.40 0.55 131.13 4813 9.47 7.47 0.98 46.60 4917
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Table 6: Time series regressions of the percentage of US-to-non-US volume in the USD
and EUR-denominated contracts in our sample. Date(1) is a time dummy that takes
the value 1 after the introduction of SEF trading on 2 October 2013, logRSP500 and
logRDAX are the daily log returns of the S&P 500 and DAX indices and VIX and
VDAX are estimates of the implied volatility of these indices. O/N Spread USD and
O/N Spread EUR are the differences between the overnight unsecured borrowing rates
and the respective central bank rates. Slope USD and Slope EUR are the spreads be-
tween the 10-year and 3-month government securities of the US and the investment grade
Eurozone countries respectively. Robust t-statistics are shown in the parentheses. *, **
and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. The time period is
January 1, 2013 to September 15, 2014.
US-to-non-US US-to-non-US
(USD) (EUR)
Date(1) 0.0137 -0.1608***
(0.96) (-10.76)
logRSP500 -0.0634 0.2010
(-0.10) (0.34)
logRDAX -0.0156 -0.1819
(-0.03) (-0.47)
VIX 0.0022 -0.0011
(0.72) (-0.40)
VDAX 0.0017 0.0016
(0.61) (0.56)
O/N Spread USD 0.1256 -0.1888
(0.80) (-1.22)
O/N Spread EUR -0.0831* -0.0619*
(-1.90) (-1.68)
Slope USD 0.0095 0.0162
(0.38) (0.62)
Slope EUR 0.0001 0.0306
(0.00) (1.59)
Constant 0.3748*** 0.0981*
(6.30) (1.77)
R2 0.089 0.734
N 307 307
47
 
 
 
Staff Working Paper No. 580 July 2016 
 
Table 7: Fragmentation panel regressions. We show the estimation results of speci-
fication (7) for EUR-denominated contracts. The dispersion metrics and the Amihud
measure are defined in equations (1), (2) and (3) respectively. V lm is the amount of
gross notional traded in US dollars, Ntrades is the number of trades executed and
Nparties is the number of unique counterparties active on a given day. fragm is one
minus the percentage of volume traded between US and non-US counterparties, Date(1)
is a time dummy that takes the value 1 after the introduction of SEF trading on 2
October 2013, logRSP500 and logRDAX are the daily log returns of the S&P 500 and
DAX indices and VIX and VDAX are estimates of the implied volatility of these indices.
O/N Spread USD and O/N Spread EUR are the differences between the overnight unse-
cured borrowing rates and the respective central bank rates. Slope USD and Slope EUR
are the spreads between the 10-year and 3-month government securities of the US and
the investment grade Eurozone countries respectively. The model is estimated using
maturity fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by maturity. Robust t-statistics are
shown in the parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels
respectively. The time period is January 1, 2013 to September 15, 2014.
Disp (vw) Disp (JNS) Amihud Vlm Ntrades Nparties
fragm -0.5964 -0.4729 0.1609 -2.0472*** -3.2927** -1.3109**
(-0.90) (-0.81) (0.39) (-4.69) (-2.97) (-2.63)
Date(1) -0.3866*** -0.8235* -2.0481*** 0.0016 -3.3319** 0.2955
(-3.94) (-2.14) (-5.56) (0.01) (-2.95) (1.05)
logRSP500 -3.9949 0.4508 10.0129* 6.8007 107.6561*** 27.0525***
(-0.60) (0.35) (2.09) (1.38) (3.33) (3.10)
logRDAX -9.8511 -19.2031 3.9104 -2.3227 -56.2627 -7.5684
(-1.06) (-1.70) (1.19) (-0.54) (-1.43) (-1.01)
VIX 0.1112 0.1714 0.0911 0.0666** 0.8843*** 0.1538***
(1.27) (1.13) (1.52) (2.53) (3.11) (3.24)
VDAX -0.1058 -0.1859 0.0257 -0.0369* -0.3495 0.0391
(-1.21) (-1.00) (0.40) (-2.04) (-1.62) (0.68)
O/N Spread USD 0.4546 3.2035 0.0971 -3.2532*** -24.0778*** -6.5624**
(0.90) (1.67) (0.08) (-3.39) (-3.07) (-2.76)
O/N Spread EUR 0.3861*** 0.7816*** -0.2917 1.7321** 10.4110 1.7546
(3.30) (3.65) (-0.68) (2.51) (1.76) (1.05)
Slope USD -0.4361 -0.1518 0.9323 -1.3911** -10.0635* -1.6763**
(-1.15) (-1.61) (1.02) (-2.34) (-2.06) (-2.35)
Slope EUR 1.5835 1.8480 0.1223 1.3761** 7.7884 1.2913
(1.23) (1.56) (0.11) (2.47) (1.73) (1.00)
Constant 2.7965** 8.1578* 15.2246*** 6.3808*** 42.0813*** 17.7457***
(2.15) (1.91) (6.09) (8.77) (14.51) (22.58)
R2 0.003 0.010 0.215 0.036 0.041 0.024
N 5749 5749 5178 5749 5749 5749
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